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Reference Through Mental Files : 
Indexicals and Definite Descriptions* 
 
 
 
1. Nondescriptive Modes of Presentation as Mental Files 
 
In the Fregean framework, modes of presentation provide a solution to the following puzzle. 
There are well-known situations in which a rational subject thinks of a given object a both 
that it is and that it is not F. (For example, Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy, and he 
also believes that he is not a spy.) How can that be ? Frege solved the problem by appealing to 
modes of presentation over and above the objects thought about. A rational subject can 
believe of a, thought of under a mode of presentation m, that it is F, and at the same time 
believe of the same object a, thought of under a different mode of presentation m’, that it is 
not F. Insofar as the modes of presentation are distinct, there is no irrationality. 
According to an influential view favoured by Frege himself, modes of presentation are 
descriptions of the referent. When we think about an object, we think of it as ‘the F’, where F 
is some uniquely-identifying property of the referent. This view is known as Descriptivism. 
An alternative to Descriptivism is Singularism, which comes in two varieties. The Russellian 
variety says that in some cases, we don’t think of an object through a description of it, but 
‘directly’, where this means that there is no mode of presentation whatsoever. The thought 
involves the object itself, not a mode of presentation of it. Since modes of presentation are 
involved whenever identity confusions are possible, and identity confusions are almost always 
possible, the Russellian option is only marginally different from Descriptivism. Direct 
reference is possible in a few exceptional cases, e.g. when one refers to one’s own sense-data, 
but everything else is thought about descriptively.1 So a true Singularist should go for the 
other option – the neo-Fregean option. 
In the neo-Fregean framework, there are two types of mode of presentation, 
corresponding to two modes of reference determination. An object is thought of descriptively 
iff it is thought of as the bearer of some identifying property. The thought contains a uniquely 
                                                 
* The research reported in this paper has been funded by the European Community’s Seventh 
Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement n° FP7-238128 and ERC 
grant agreement n° 229441–CCC. 
1 I take Lewis’s centered-worlds approach to be a variant of the Russellian position, but I 
can’t go into exegetical matters in this article. 
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identifying description of some object, and the reference — the object thought about — is 
whatever satisfies the description. In contrast, nondescriptive modes of presentation rest on 
acquaintance relations to objects in the environment. The reference in this case is determined 
relationally : it is the object with which the subject happens to be acquainted — whether or 
not that object ‘fits’ the subject’s representation of it. In this framework, identity confusions 
are still possible even though the thought is nondescriptive— the subject may be related to the 
same object twice, without realizing it, and may end up ascribing contradictory properties to 
that object without ceasing to be rational. 
In my implementation of the neo-Fregean framework, nondescriptive modes of 
presentation are mental files. Mental files are based upon acquaintance relations to objects in 
the environment : their role is to store the information we derive from an object in virtue of 
standing in some acquaintance relation to it. The ‘mode of presentation’ under which the 
object is thought of is not constituted by the properties which the thinker takes the referent to 
have (i.e. the properties represented in the file) but, rather, by the file itself. The file is what 
plays the role which Fregean theory assigns to modes of presentation. In all the relevant 
instances in which modes of presentation are needed to account for the subject’s rationality 
(e.g. Quine’s ‘Ortcutt’ example, or Kripke’s puzzle about belief), the subject has two distinct 
files about one and the same object, and that is what enables him or her to ascribe contrary 
predicates to that object without (internal) contradiction. 
Among the predicates in a file, some have the distinguishing property that they are 
‘singular’, i.e. they are supposed to be satisfied by a unique object. ‘Tallest mountain in 
Europe’ is a case in point. That is a predicate which my MONT BLANC file contains, along 
with other predicates such as ‘called Mont Blanc’ or ‘4000 metres high’, but it differs from 
these predicates in being singular. Descriptivism holds that, in singular thought, we exercise 
such predicates, which serve as individual concepts : we think of the object the thought is 
about as ‘the F’ — e.g. the tallest peak in Europe. 2 I hold that we do not think of objects in 
this manner when we entertain a singular thought : we think of them under nondescriptive 
modes of presentation, that is, mental files. Still, singular predicates have a role to play in the 
                                                 
2 Individual concepts correspond to (partial) functions from situations to individuals. With 
respect to any situation in which there is a unique F, the function returns that object as value. 
The function is undefined for all situations in which there is no F or more than one. NB. 
Following Kaplan (1978), Abbott (2011) introduces another kind of individual concepts 
which are ‘constant’ rather than ‘variable’, that is, which return the same object irrespective 
of the situation talked about. Abbott’s constant individual concepts are nonsatisfactional 
(nondescriptional, as she says), so mental files would count as constant individual concepts by 
her characterization. 
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communication of singular thoughts. Singular predicates may occur as part of the content of 
files, and, like any piece of information in a file, they can, if expressed, trigger the activation 
of the file to the content of which they belong. It is this mechanism which I think accounts for 
referential communication. 
 
2. Referential Communication : The Basic Mechanism 
 
Indexicals have descriptive meanings in virtue of which they present their referent as having 
certain identificatory properties – being the speaker in the case of ‘I’, being the hearer in the 
case of ‘you’, and so forth. These meanings qualify as ‘modes of presentation’, but they are 
linguistic modes of presentation and as such should be distinguished from the modes of 
presentation that occur in thought : psychological modes of presentation, as I call them 
(Recanati 1990, 1993). Linguistic modes of presentation correspond to the reference rule 
encoded by the indexical (‘I’ refers to the speaker, ‘you’ to the addressee, etc.). In contrast, 
psychological modes of presentation are answerable to Frege’s cognitive constraint on 
rational subjects : if a rational subject can think of an object a both that it is F and that it is not 
F, this shows that there are two distinct modes of presentation m and m’ under which the 
subject in question thinks of a when he thinks that it is F and when he thinks it is not F 
(Schiffer 1978 : 180 ; McDowell 2005 : 48-49). 
That the two types of mode of presentation can come apart is easily seen in the case of 
indexicals. The linguistic mode of presentation is fixed by convention hence it is the same for 
the speaker and his audience. For both of them the reference of ‘I’ is presented as the speaker, 
the person who utters the current token of ‘I’. But the speaker and the hearer don’t think of 
that person in the same way. The speaker thinks of that person as being himself (or herself), 
i.e. by exercising the first person concept, while the hearer thinks of the person talking to him 
or her under a very different mode of presentation. Or take an utterance like ‘That ship is 
longer than that ship’ and suppose that, unbeknown to the speaker, the same ship is 
demonstrated twice. By Frege’s constraint, two distinct psychological modes of presentation 
must be involved, but the linguistic meaning of the phrase ‘that ship’ stays constant across 
occurrences, hence the linguistic mode of presentation also stays constant. (This example 
shows that the linguistic mode of presentation may not be determinate enough to fix the 
reference. Often it only ‘contrains’ the reference.) 
The linguistic modes of presentation conventionally associated with the indexicals are 
singular predicates (‘speaker of u’, ‘hearer of u’, where ‘u’ is the utterance in which the 
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indexical occurs), but the predicates in question are not what the indexicals contribute to the 
expressed thought. What the indexicals contribute, rather, are mental files to the content of 
which the predicates belong. The mental files in question play the role of psychological mode 
of presentation. Thus the speaker expresses a thought with his own SELF file as a constituent, 
when he says ‘I’ ; he thinks of himself in the first person way. The singular predicate 
associated with the word ‘I’ is contained in the speaker’s SELF file (since the speaker is 
conscious of being the speaker) and it stands for the whole file to the content of which it 
belongs. When the hearer processes the speaker’s utterance, the same singular predicate 
associated with the word ‘I’ evokes, in the hearer’s mind, the hearer’s mental file containing 
that predicate, and that file is the hearer’s file about the person speaking to him. So, in 
understanding the speaker’s utterance, the hearer forms a singular thought about the speaker 
that matches the thought expressed by the speaker since both thoughts have the same singular 
truth-conditions, but differs from that thought in that the (nondescriptive) modes of 
presentation they involve are distinct for the speaker and for the hearer : the speaker thinks of 
the referent of ‘I’ as being himself — he exercises his SELF concept — while the hearer thinks 
of the referent of ‘I’ in a third person way. 
On this picture, the singular predicate associated with an indexical stands for some 
mental file to which it belongs : what the thought contains is the mental file (a nondescriptive 
mode of presentation) rather than the singular predicate whose role is merely to stand for the 
file and trigger its activation. If the thought contained the singular predicate, the referent 
would be thought of descriptively rather than nondescriptively. 
The same story applies to the referential use of definite descriptions (Recanati 1993 : 
294-96). The singular predicate encoded by a description may be what the description 
contributes to the thought expressed by the speaker (attributive use), but it may also stand for 
some file to which it belongs (referential use). Donnellan gives the following example : 
 
One is at a party and, seeing an interesting-looking person holding a martini glass, one 
asks, ―Who is the man drinking a martini ?― If it should turn out that there is only 
water in the glass, one has nevertheless asked a question about a particular person, a 
question that it is possible for someone to answer. (Donnellan 1966 : 48) 
 
Here the speaker uses the description ‘the man drinking a martini’. Had the description been 
used attributively, its reference (if any) would be determined ‘satisfactionally’ as whoever 
uniquely possesses the property of being a man drinking a martini. But the description has 
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been used referentially : the speaker has a certain object in mind, i.e. he stands in some 
acquaintance relation to some object he wants to say something about. Despite the speaker’s 
choice of the description to pick out the man in question, what determines his reference is the 
relevant relation : here, the perceptual relation singles out a man (the interesting-looking 
person the speaker is watching) who as a matter of fact drinks water, not martini. 
In this example, the singular predicate ‘man drinking a martini’ stands for a 
demonstrative file based upon the speaker’s perceptual relation to the interesting-looking 
person holding a martini glass. In that demonstrative file, the speaker stores information 
gained through the acquaintance relation, such as the information that the referent (the man he 
is watching) holds a martini glass and, presumably, drinks a martini. By using the description 
referentially, the speaker expresses a demonstrative thought about that man — a thought 
involving his demonstrative file as a constituent. On the hearer’s side, the same mechanism is 
at work : the predicate ‘man drinking a martini’ readily evokes for the hearer her own file 
about the presumed martini-drinker. If there is no preexisting file containing the singular 
predicate in the mind of the hearer, but she takes the speaker to express a singular thought, 
she will put herself in the right epistemic position by looking in the same direction as the 
speaker and acquiring a demonstrative file about the man holding the martini glass, which file 
will make it possible for her to entertain a singular thought about the man in question in order 
to understand what the speaker is saying. 
The main difference between indexicals and definite descriptions is that the role of the 
singular predicate encoded by an indexical is purely instrumental : it is to evoke the file to 
which the predicate belongs. The singular predicate itself cannot be what the indexical 
contributes to the thought (with the exception of so-called ‘descriptive indexicals’, which are 
somewhat marginal and which I leave aside here).3 In the case of definite descriptions, in 
contrast, there are two options on the same footing. The description may contribute either the 
singular predicate it encodes (attributive use) or the mental file to which that predicate 
belongs (referential use). The mode of presentation of the reference is descriptive in the 
former case, nondescriptive in the latter. Just as in the case of indexicals, the mental files will 
not remain stable across subjects, but each conversational protagonist will have to entertain a 
thought involving a similar mental file, based upon some relation to the referent and including 
the singular predicate in question. 
                                                 
3 On descriptive uses of indexicals, see Direct Reference (Recanati 1993), chapter 16. 
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How do we account for the fact that the step from the singular predicate to the mental 
file to which it belongs is mandatory in the case of indexicals ? In Direct Reference I offered 
an account based on the following premises : 
 
1. In addition to encoding a singular predicate, indexicals carry a lexical feature, REF, 
which indicates that the truth-condition of the utterance where the indexical occurs is 
singular. (The truth-condition of an utterance G(t) is singular just in case there is an 
object x such that the utterance is true if and only if x satisfies G( ).) 
2. A general ‘principle of congruence’ requires the thoughts entertained by an interpreter 
upon understanding an utterance to match the truth-conditional content of that 
utterance. This entails that, if the utterance (because of REF) is bound to have singular 
truth-conditions, the interpreter’s thought should have singular truth-conditions too. 
3. Only thoughts featuring nondescriptive modes of presentation (mental files) are truth-
conditionally singular : thoughts involving descriptive modes of presentation are truth-
conditionally general.4 
 
Together, the three premises entail that the thought entertained by an interpreter upon 
understanding an utterance with an indexical will have to feature a nondescriptive mode of 
presentation, that is, a mental file. The singular mode of presentation encoded by the indexical 
will not be a possible constituent of the thought. Its (purely instrumental) role is to raise the 
salience of some mental file to the content of which it belongs, thus making that mental file 
available as a constituent of the thought through which the utterance is interpreted. 
 
3. Denotation, Semantic Reference, and Speaker’s Reference 
 
The issue arises, whether the mechanism I have described — the linguistic evocation of 
mental files via elements of their content — should be considered as semantically relevant, or 
relegated to ‘pragmatics’. I will frame the issue in terms of Donnellan’s distinction between 
‘denotation’ and ‘reference’. A description may be used referentially or attributively, but even 
when a description does not ‘refer’ in Donnellan’s sense, it ‘denotes’ : 
                                                 
4 This premise can be doubted, on the grounds that actuality operators can make a descriptive 
thought truth-conditionally singular. But this issue has more complexity than meets the eye. 
To actualize a description in thought, we need to open a mental file, and mental files are 
primarily a tool for nondescriptive thinking. See Recanati 2012 : chapter 13 on the (derived) 
‘actualizing function’ of files. 
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Russell’s definition of denoting (a definite description denotes an entity if that entity 
fits the description uniquely) is clearly applicable to either use of descriptions. (…) 
Hence, denoting and referring, as I have explicated the latter notion, are distinct… If 
one tried to maintain that they are the same notion, one result would be that a speaker 
might be referring to something without knowing it. If someone said, for example, in 
1960, before he had any idea that Mr Goldwater would be the Republican nominee in 
1964, ‘The Republican candidate for president in 1964 will be a conservative,’ 
(perhaps on the basis of an analysis of the views of party leaders) the definite 
description here would denote Mr Goldwater. But would we wish to say that the 
speaker had referred to, mentioned, or talked about Mr Goldwater ? I feel these terms 
would be out of place. (Donnellan 1966 : 54-55) 
 
The denotation is fixed satisfactionally : a description ‘the F’ denotes whatever is F if 
a unique object is, and nothing otherwise. Reference is an entirely different matter, according 
to Donnellan. Reference involves ‘having in mind’, something that requires some relation to 
the object thought about.5 In the present framework, this is cashed out by saying that the 
reference of an expression is always the reference of some mental file containing the predicate 
associated with the expression. The reference of a file, as we have seen, is determined 
relationally. 
Note that the denotation/reference distinction applies to indexicals as well as to 
definite descriptions. An indexical ‘denotes’ whatever satisfies the linguistic mode of 
presentation (assuming a single object does), but the denotatum need not be what the speaker 
who uses the indexical refers to. Consider Rip van Winkle. He goes to bed one evening (on 
day d) and wakes up twenty years later. He does not know that he has slept for more than one 
night, so he thinks of d as ‘yesterday’. Now which day does he refer to when he says 
‘Yesterday was a nice day’ ? This is a tricky question. In virtue of the reference rule 
associated with the word ‘yesterday’, it seems that it must refer to the day preceding the day 
of utterance. But that is not the day Rip is referring to and characterizing as a nice day. Rip 
refers to the day he remembers, namely d, of which he wrongly believes that it is the previous 
day (so that his memory file contains the predicate ‘previous day’ which the indexical 
exploits). Donnellan’s distinction between denotation and reference comes in handy here : we 
                                                 
5 On Donnellan’s notion of ‘having in mind’, see Kaplan (2011). 
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can say that the denotation of Rip’s use of ‘yesterday’ is the day before his utterance, while 
the reference — what Rip himself refers to and describes as a nice day — is d, the last waking 
day he remembers. 
We see that for indexicals too, the reference, understood à la Donnellan, is the 
reference of some mental file containing the encoded predicate. Just as for definite 
descriptions, whether the reference actually satisfies the singular predicate is irrelevant since 
the reference is determined relationally. Thus Rip refers to day d by saying ‘Yesterday was a 
nice day’, even though d is not actually the previous day. He can do so because d is the 
referent of his memory file, a file that contains both the predicates ‘previous day’ and ‘nice 
day’. Likewise, the subject in Donnellan’s example refers to the man he is looking at when he 
says ‘the man drinking a martini is a famous philosopher’, even though the man in question is 
not drinking a martini, but water. This is possible because that man is the reference of the 
speaker’s demonstrative file based on the perception of the man in question, and the file 
contains the predicate ‘man drinking a martini’ (and also the predicate ‘famous philosopher’). 
But is reference, thus understood, relevant to semantics ? Many philosophers think 
that it is not. As far as definite descriptions are concerned, there is a well-known position 
according to which the referential/attributive distinction is a matter of speaker’s meaning and 
does not affect truth-conditional content.6 Whether or not the speaker ‘refers’, and to what, by 
using a description that denotes a certain object, is irrelevant to semantics. Only denotation 
matters to semantic content. The same thing holds for indexicals. Even if Rip refers to d by 
his use of ‘yesterday’, this is speaker’s reference, not semantic reference. The semantic 
reference is what the word itself refers to – its ‘denotation’. In general, the use of improper 
descriptions or improper indexicals to refer to some object the speaker has in mind has no 
direct relevance to semantics. Such use is like the improper use of names, as Kripke pointed 
out. In Kripke’s example, the speaker refers to Smith (the man he sees raking the leaves) but, 
under the misapprehension that the man he sees raking the leaves is Jones, he uses the name 
‘Jones’ to refer to him (Kripke 1977 : 263). As Kripke says, the name ‘Jones’ refers to Jones 
(semantic referent) even if the speaker who uses the name has someone else in mind, namely 
Smith (speaker’s referent). Indeed the speaker’s utterance ‘Jones is raking the leaves’ is 
                                                 
6 The pragmatic account goes back to Peter Geach (1962) and Paul Grice (1969) ; see also 
Kripke (1977), Sainsbury (1979), Davies (1981) and Evans (1982), to mention some of the 
early advocates. For a review and a sustained defence of the account, see Neale (1990 : 
chapter 3). 
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intuitively false in that sort of case, if the man seen raking the leaves happens to be Smith 
(and Jones does not happen to be raking the leaves at the same time).  
How does the denotation/reference distinction relate to the semantic 
reference/speaker’s reference distinction ? One option — corresponding to the pragmatic 
account I have just presented — is to say that they are just the same distinction : the 
denotation of an expression is its semantic reference. So, in the case of Rip van Winkle, the 
day d is the speaker’s reference, and the semantic reference is the day before the day of 
utterance, i.e. the denotation. Similarly, when the speaker in Kripke’s example uses the name 
‘Jones’ to refer to Smith, Smith is only the speaker’s reference ; the semantic reference is 
Jones, the bearer of the name (and the satisfier of the metalinguistic predicate ‘called Jones’). 
But the view that the semantic reference just is the denotation ought to be resisted if one takes 
the referential use of descriptions to be semantically relevant. For, as Donnellan points out, 
descriptions denote whether they are used referentially or attributively. If denotation equals 
semantic reference, there can be no semantic difference between the referential use and the 
attributive use : the description will have the same ‘semantic reference’ in both cases (viz. the 
denotation). It follows that the equation of denotation and semantic reference can be 
maintained only by someone who holds that the referential use of definite descriptions is 
always a matter of speaker’s meaning or speaker’s reference. 
There are philosophers who take the referential use of descriptions to be semantically 
relevant, however. They stress the analogy between indexicals and definite descriptions (on 
their referential use).7 According to their account, the descriptive meaning of a referential 
description has a purely instrumental role – it serves to fix the reference. The semantic content 
of the utterance is a singular proposition, just as it is when an indexical is used instead of a 
description. In contrast, when descriptions are used attributively, the semantic content of the 
utterance is a general proposition. Now, if one treats the referential use of descriptions as 
semantically relevant in this way, as I think one should if one wants to capture the striking 
analogy with indexicals, one needs a threefold distinction between denotation, semantic 
reference, and speaker’s reference. When a description is used attributively, as in Donnellan’s 
‘Goldwater’ example, it does not refer (though it denotes). When a description is used 
referentially, it refers, but sometimes its reference is mere ‘speaker’s reference’, while in 
other cases it is ‘semantic reference’. The reference will be (mere) speaker’s reference in all 
                                                 
7 See Stalnaker (1970), Peacocke (1975) and Kaplan (1978) for early statements of the 
semantic view, and Recanati (1989) for a defence of the view against the ‘ambiguity’ 
objection raised by Kripke and many others. 
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the cases in which it does not satisfy the singular predicate encoded by the expression. But 
that does not prevent us from acknowledging a genuine semantic contrast between attributive 
and referential uses. On the referential use, if the description is proper, that is, if what the 
speaker refers to satisfies the description, then the truth-condition of the utterance is singular, 
in contrast to what happens when the description is used attributively. 
Note that for indexicals we don’t need the threefold distinction between denotation, 
semantic reference and speaker reference, because indexicals are bound to be used 
referentially (again, leaving aside the descriptive uses which are somewhat marginal). We 
only need a distinction between the cases in which an indexical is used to refer to its 
denotation, and the cases like Rip van Winkle in which an indexical is used to refer to 
something other than its denotation (speaker’s reference). 
 
4. The Millian Approach 
 
In the previous section I introduced the two main approaches to the referential/attributive 
distinction currently on the market. According to the pragmatic account, all referential uses of 
definite descriptions, whether proper or improper, are, indeed, uses and, as such, they are of 
concern to pragmatics, which deals with uses, but not to semantics, which deals with 
meanings. According to the semantic account, proper referential uses make a distinctive 
(singular) contribution to semantic content, but improper uses, that is, cases in which the 
speaker refers to something which does not satisfy the description, are to be ignored as 
irrelevant to semantic content. The implicit premise here is that a necessary condition for an 
object to be the semantic referent is that it satisfies the encoded predicate. Now there is a third 
type of position, less familiar but closer to Donnellan’s original inspiration, which rejects that 
premise, on the grounds that reference is determined relationally, not satisfactionally. It is that 
position which I would like to explore in this section. 
The semantic account takes seriously the idea that descriptions can be used a devices 
of direct reference. But there are two notions of direct reference on the market : the strong, 
Millian notion, and the weaker, Kaplanian notion.8 The semantic account is based on the 
                                                 
8 The strong notion of direct reference is that I mentioned in connection with Russell in the 
first section of the paper : reference is direct, for Russell, only if there is no mode of 
presentation of the reference. Russell’s notion of a ‘logically proper name’, construed as a tag 
that is directly assigned to an object, is characteristically Millian. 
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Kaplanian notion, while the less familiar account I am about to present is based on the Millian 
notion. 
According to the Millian notion, a directly referential expression is like a ‘tag’ to 
which an object is directly assigned without going through a satisfactional mechanism. Proper 
names are directly referential in the strong sense — they are ‘tags’ — but personal pronouns 
like ‘I’ and ‘you’ are not because they carry a descriptive meaning and present their referent 
as, respectively, the speaker or the addressee. On the Kaplanian picture, direct reference is 
compatible with the possession of such meaning : what matters for direct reference in the 
weaker, Kaplanian sense is only the truth-conditional irrelevance of the mode of presentation 
(Recanati 1993). The mode of presentation (or ‘character’) only plays an instrumental role : it 
provides a way of identifying the referent in context, but it is the referent, not the mode of 
presentation, which contributes to the possible world truth-conditions of the utterance.  
The standard semantic approach, defended by Kaplan and Stalnaker, takes referential 
descriptions to be directly referential in the weak sense, just like indexicals. A referentially 
used description ‘the F’ presents its referent as being the F, but what is truth-conditionally 
relevant, on that use, is only the referent picked out through the property of being the F. The 
descriptive meaning of the description only serves to ‘fix the reference’, just as the character 
of an indexical only serves to ‘fix the reference’ of the expression in context. According to the 
Millians, however, (i) the mere truth-conditional irrelevance of the mode of presentation is 
not sufficient for direct reference in the strong sense, and (ii) Donnellan’s comparison of 
referential descriptions with ‘logically proper names’ clearly indicates that he took referential 
descriptions to be directly referential in just that sense. 
Genoveva Martì has eloquently expressed the Millian point of view and its rejection of 
the standard semantic approach à la Kaplan/Stalnaker : 
 
What defines a referential use of a definite description, or of any device, is… the 
absence of a semantic mechanism to search for and determine the referent… If a 
definite description can be used as a device of direct reference in this sense, the 
attributes associated with it should not play a role in the determination of reference. 
Therefore, if a definite description ‘the F’ can be used referentially, in the strong 
sense, it must be possible to use it to refer to an object independently of whether that 
object satisfies the attributes associated with ‘the F’. And that’s the characteristic mark 
of referential uses of descriptions according to Donnellan. (Martì 2008 : 49 ; emphasis 
mine) 
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What Martì objects to is the idea that definite descriptions can only be directly 
referential in the weak sense. She thinks this misses the thrust of Donnellan’s original 
observations. Indeed, Donnellan has much insisted on the fact that a referentially used definite 
description need not be ‘satisfied’ by its referent. In the martini example, the man referred to 
by means of the description ‘the man drinking a martini’ may actually be drinking water, not 
martini. Such ‘improper’ uses of definite descriptions have been ignored by proponents of the 
standard semantic account, or explicitly put aside as semantically irrelevant (Recanati 1993 : 
281-84). 
The Millian thinks a directly referential expression is like a tag, so if a definite 
description can be a device of direct reference, it must be possible for it to target a referent 
and get assigned to it in context, whether or not the referent possesses the property encoded 
by the description. The property in question, though semantically encoded, becomes irrelevant 
when the description is used referentially because the mechanism through which the referent 
is determined is no longer the satisfactional mechanism but a different, relational mechanism. 
I think Martì is right: the anti-descriptivist thrust of early theories of direct reference 
such as Donnellan’s is lost if we say that the singular predicate encoded by a referentially 
used description or an indexical ‘fixes the reference’ of the expression. Two-dimensional 
Descriptivism is still Descriptivism. The mental-file account preserves the original, Millian 
inspiration of direct reference theories in giving pride of place to acquaintance relations and 
downplaying satisfactional factors. According to the account, a referentially used description 
refers to what the mental file containing the encoded predicate is about, and the file is about 
the entity to which it is appropriately related. That entity may or may not satisfy the singular 
predicate which occurs in the file and which the referential description exploits (to activate in 
the hearer’s mind the appropriate counterpart of the mental file in the speaker’s mind). In 
Donnellan’s example, ‘the man drinking a martini’, the singular predicate does not even ‘fix 
the reference’ since the reference does not satisfy the predicate. 
 To say that the referent of a referential expression is the referent of the appropriate file 
is to say that linguistic meaning does not determine reference directly, as it does on 
‘satisfactional’ approaches. The linguistic meaning of a referential expression (whether a 
description, an indexical, or a name) 9 takes us to an intermediary entity, namely the relevant 
                                                 
9 In the case of proper names the mode of presentation contributed by the expression type is 
arguably metalinguistic. The referent of a name NN is presented as bearing the name NN. In 
addition proper names carry the feature REF. The utterance of a name NN therefore triggers 
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mental file, and the reference of the expression just is the reference of the file. As Chastain 
puts it, 
 
A theory of singular reference will have to be combined  with a systematic account of 
certain internal states of the speaker — his thoughts,  beliefs, perceptions, memories, 
and so on — which are, so to speak, the intermediate links connecting the singular 
terms he utters with their referents out in the world. These intermediaries can 
themselves be understood only if we treat them as being quasi-linguistic in structure 
and content (…) and as containing elements analogous to singular terms which can be 
referentially connected with things in the world...’ (Chastain 1975 : 197) 
 
What about the semantic reference/speaker’s reference distinction ? From Donnellan 
and Chastain to Martì, the Millians tend to ignore it, but that is a mistake. As far as I am 
concerned, I am in sympathy with the nonsatisfactional approach to reference determination 
put forward by the Millian — an approach I try to implement in my book Mental Files — but 
I take it as obvious that the use of improper descriptions to trigger the relevant mental file in 
the hearer’s mind has no direct relevance to semantics. Such use is like the improper use of 
names, as Kripke pointed out.  
Let us assume, with the Millian, that the reference of a description is determined 
nonsatisfactionally : it always is the reference of some file containing the predicate encoded 
by the description. We can still distinguish between the case in which the description is proper 
and the case in which it is improper. The reference of the file, on the improper use, will not 
count as semantic reference for obvious reasons ; it will be mere ‘speaker’s reference’. But 
when the reference of the file satisfies the descriptive material, the speaker’s reference 
becomes semantic reference. On that view, which we may call the ‘moderate Millian view’ 
(MM view for short), neither the denotation nor the reference of the file count as ‘semantic 
reference’ when they diverge. There is semantic reference only when they converge. 
One consequence of this view is that the day before the utterance (a day which Rip 
slept through and had no acquaintance with) cannot be the semantic reference in the Rip van 
Winkle case. It cannot be the reference (but only the denotation) because the epistemological 
constraints on reference are not met. But the day Rip was referring to — the day d he 
remembers and mistakes for the previous day — cannot be the semantic reference either. It 
                                                                                                                                                        
the search for a mental file containing the information ‘called NN’. The referent of a file 
containing that information may not actually be called by that name (improper uses). 
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cannot be the semantic reference (but only the speaker’s reference) because the correctness 
conditions imposed by the linguistic material are not met. 
 
5. An Argument for the Millian View 
 
On the MM view the reference (vs denotation) of a description always is the reference of 
some mental file or dossier to which the description belongs (Grice 1969), but there are two 
sorts of case to consider. The reference of a file counts as ‘semantic reference’ when, and only 
when, the predicate used to activate the file is a predicate which the reference actually 
satisfies. 
What exactly is the difference between the MM view and the standard semantic 
account ? If Martì is right, the problem with the standard semantic account is that the 
semantic reference is said to be determined satisfactionally : it is what fits the singular 
predicate encoded by the referring expression. To be sure, the speaker’s referential intention 
is acknowledged and ascribed semantic significance : when a description is used referentially 
the referent goes into truth-conditional content in lieu of the reference-fixing condition. But 
the descriptive condition encoded by the expression is what determines the reference, and that 
is what the Millian is objecting to. On the MM view, in contrast, the reference is determined 
relationally — it is the reference of the file — even if satisfaction of the encoded predicate 
comes into play to distinguish semantic reference from speaker’s reference. 
Is there an argument in support of the MM view as opposed to what I will henceforth 
call the satisfactional view ? I think there is. It has been pointed out that, just like definite 
descriptions, indefinite descriptions can be used referentially to activate a file (Chastain 
1975). George Wilson (1978) gives the following example : 
 
(1) A convicted embezzler is trying to seduce your sister 
 
The non-singular predicate ‘convicted embezzler’ encoded by the indefinite description in (1) 
does not determine a unique object, so the reference cannot be determined satisfactionally 
here – it is bound to be determined relationally (the speaker is referring to the man he is 
looking at). To be sure, this is not much of a problem for the satisfactional approach because, 
on standard accounts, indefinite descriptions are not semantically referential, so they should 
not be expected to carry ‘semantic reference’ anyway: whatever reference occurs with them is 
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bound to be speaker’s reference. The satisfactional view need not deny that speaker’s 
reference is determined relationally. Its claim only concerns semantic reference. 
But the same sort of problem arises with so-called ‘incomplete’ definite descriptions, 
e.g. ‘the man’, ‘the car’, or ‘the table’. Incomplete descriptions are like indefinite descriptions 
in that they fail to determine a singular denotation. They can only achieve singular reference 
via the file to which they belong. But, qua definite descriptions, they are supposed to carry 
semantic reference.10 So they raise a dilemma for the satisfactional theorist : s/he must either 
give up the claim that incomplete descriptions have semantic referents, or give up the claim 
that semantic reference is determined satisfactionally. Since the latter claim defines the view 
as opposed to the MM view, the first option is the only one that can be seriously considered. 
So the satisfactional theorist must say that an incomplete description can only carry speaker’s 
reference, not semantic reference. From a semantic point of view, incomplete descriptions are 
defective. 
The problem is that almost all the definite descriptions we use in referential 
communication are incomplete, so an account which treats them as special in this way (and 
passes them down to another branch of the theory — the pragmatics — for special treatment) 
is less attractive than an account which straightforwardly makes room for them. This suggests 
that we should rather start from incomplete descriptions, and acknowledge the fact that they 
don’t ‘denote’ (in Donnellan’s sense). Given that they don’t denote, if they are still granted a 
semantic referent, that referent will not be determined satisfactionally, but via the files to 
which the non singular predicate belongs. As Donnellan writes,  
 
In these examples some particular [objects] are being talked about, and the definite 
descriptions (…) seem surely to have particular semantic referents. If the descriptive 
content of the uttered descriptions even augmented by background assumptions, etc., 
is insufficient to determine the referents, how is this possible ? My answer will not be 
unexpected. The person having some [object] in mind to talk about can provide the 
needed definiteness. (1978 : 60-61)11 
 
                                                 
10 Or at least, that is so unless one accepts Russell’s claim that definite descriptions are just as 
nonreferential semantically as indefinite descriptions. See Neale 1990 for a defence of that 
view. 
11 See Strawson 1950 : 14-15 for a similar argument using incomplete descriptions. Kripke 
himself suggests that incomplete descriptions  are the best argument in favour of Donnellan’s 
picture (Kripke 1977 : 255-56, 271). 
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At this point, to unify the theory of descriptions, the best strategy is to generalize this 
relational account to all definite descriptions. On the resulting account (the MM view), the 
reference of a referentially used description is the reference of some file containing the 
encoded predicate, and it counts as ‘semantic reference’ only if it actually satisfies the 
predicate. (The predicate in question may, but need not, be singular.) 
The MM view is similar to the view held by some linguists regarding pronouns, 
including indexical pronouns such as ‘I’ and ‘you’. Pronouns are treated as variables which 
(unless they are bound) must be assigned values in context, and which also carry 
presuppositions, corresponding to the ‘features’ of the pronoun (gender, number, etc.). The 
semantic reference of a pronoun is the value contextually assigned to it, provided the value in 
question satisfies the presuppositions. There is no semantic reference if the value assigned to 
the pronoun does not satisfy the presuppositions – for example if I point to a male person and 
say ‘She is a philosopher’. The analysis extends to indexical pronouns such as ‘I’ and ‘you’ : 
in this case what is presupposed is that the individual the speaker contextually refers to 
possesses the property of being the speaker or the hearer. If the presupposition is satisfied, the 
speaker’s referent becomes the semantic reference of the pronoun ; otherwise the pronoun 
fails to semantically refer. Schlenker gives the following example : 
 
Suppose that I am pointing towards one person (say, to my right) while talking to 
another person (to my left). If I then utter You are nice with emphasis on you and a 
correlative pointing gesture, the result is decidedly odd — in the same way as if, 
pointing towards John, I were to say: She is nice. This is a welcome result: a 
presupposition failure is predicted because the person that is pointed to is not an 
addressee of the speech act (similarly,  she is nice is odd when pointing to John 
because she carries a presupposition that it denotes a female individual). (Schlenker 
2005 : 162) 
 
 I suggest generalizing this view : in referential communication, the descriptive 
meaning of the referring expression (the predicate it encodes) acts like a presupposition which 
the speaker’s reference (viz. the reference of the associated mental file) must satisfy. The 
speaker’s reference becomes the semantic reference only if the presupposition is satisfied.12 
                                                 
12 The idea that what fixes the reference of a referential expression always is some associated 
mental file may seem incompatible with the view that some referential expressions, e.g. 
proper names, have a reference of their own, independent of what users of the expression use 
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